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Abstract 
The shape of local government finance in the United Kingdom (UK) is changing. The UK 
Government has been promoting fiscal devolution in the context of austerity following the 
2007 global economic crisis. Consequently, local government finance is becoming an 
increasingly important issue. According to the current regulation, the revenues from business 
rates, a local tax on non-domestic properties, are pooled to the Welsh Government and then 
redistributed to the councils, based on their adult population. In the context of fiscal devolution, 
and following England and Scotland, which adopted retention of business rates income, the 
discussion for the local retention of business rates revenues in Wales is topical. This paper 
looks at the organisation of the current business rates system in Wales and the impacts of a 
potential local retention. It provides a rigorous review of the current state of business rates 
scheme and the features of the councils according to the net difference between business rates, 
settlements and contributions. The findings suggest that the current system financially backs 
the economically disadvantaged Welsh councils, whereas a local retention of business rates 
income would possibly polarise the uneven allocation of local funding. 
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Introduction 
In the context of austerity applied by the United Kingdom (UK) Government in the aftermath 
of the 2007 global economic crisis (Jones, 2011; MacKinnon, 2015) and the evolving 
devolution, the scheme of Business Rates or Non-Domestic Rates (NDR), a tax on non-
domestic properties, is of great importance in Wales, since these taxes constitute a crucial 
source of local government income. Broadly, local authority revenue in Wales stems from three 
main sources: central government grants, council tax, and NDR. According to the current 
regulation, the NDR revenues are collected by the Local Authorities (LAs), pooled to the Welsh 
Government and then redistributed to the councils alongside the Revenue Support Grant 
(RSG), based on their adult population. 
Studies on trade-offs and scenario building for Welsh local government funding (Luchinskaya 
et al., 2017; Phillips and Simpson, 2016) have focused on potential changes in council tax rates 
and revenues, since these taxes are fully devolved to the councils. A report of HWB Cymru 
(2012) has put emphasis on NDR, examining variations of the revenues across Wales and 
possible reliefs. Although there has not been a fundamental shift in the approach to local 
government finance in Wales since devolution, various reviews and studies have discussed the 
issue (Business Rates Task and Finish Group, 2012; Independent Commission on Local 
Government Finance Wales, 2016; Welsh Government, 2012a). Specifically, the local 
retention of NDR revenues was proposed by the Business Rates Task and Finish Group (TFG) 
in 2012. In 2016, the Independent Commission on Local Government Finance Wales 
(ICLGFW), was established by the Welsh Local Government Association and the Chartered 
Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy suggesting 100% retention of NDR revenue. 
These reports refer generically to potential effects on local government funding, while their 
proposals were not specific. Overall, the operation of the existing NDR model and the impacts 
of a potential retention on Welsh councils’ funding have not been analysed in depth. 
The academic and policy inquiry has focused on England (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017; 
Greenhalgh et al., 2016; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015), as local retention was adopted 
in 2013, thus initiating research related to the effects on local government finance. The 
approach in England, part of the far-reaching local financing agenda, started in 2012-13, with 
a 50% NDR retention scheme alongside tariffs or top-ups for councils’ budgets, and has 
developed since, with several 100% retention pilots already in operation (Amin-Smith et al., 
2017). The retention in effect breaks the link between business rates and the RSG. However, 
evidence shows that the English scheme has exposed the council budgets to additional 
variability on both the upside and the downside, leading to winners and losers (Greenhalgh et 
al., 2016; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). Moreover, since 2011, in practical terms, 
the councils in Scotland retain the whole amount of business rates income they generate. In 
2012-13, the Scottish Government introduced an incentive scheme under which a local 
authority retains 50% of any business rates receipts above a set target. The Scottish 
Government meets any shortfall for councils which fail to reach their target through the RSG. 
By examining the interrelationships among local governance, regional finance and public 
policy across space, and engaging with the councils’ funding channels from the Welsh 
Government and the ways the local authorities raise finance locally, the goal of this article is 
to provide a rigorous review of the existing NDR scheme in Wales. It seeks to answer the 
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following research questions: first, to examine the winners and losers of the current NDR 
system and second, to analyse the implications of a possible retention of NDR by the councils. 
The study of the existing business rates system in Wales and the potential impacts of possible 
changes could provide valuable insights and contribute in many cases to academic inquiry and 
policy-making. Primarily, it is the first in-depth investigation of the business rates system in 
Wales, which currently presents crucial differences with England and Scotland. Further, most 
studies in retention of business rates in the UK have sought to evaluate the impact of policy 
changes that have been already adopted (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017; Greenhalgh et al., 
2016; Mor and Sandford, 2017; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). This paper adds to 
this literature by studying the potential impacts of a future retention of NDR by the Welsh 
councils, responding to calls of the National Audit Office (2017) for an ex-ante evaluation of 
the NDR system changes’ implications. Additionally, considering that other studies on NDR 
flows in the UK have adopted case-study approach and descriptive statistics (Greenhalgh et al., 
2016; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015; Williams, 2011), the methodology that this paper 
adopts is unique, as it employs correlation and regression analysis. Correlation analysis 
captures the relation between specific features of the councils and NDR contributions and 
settlements. Regression analysis examines the interrelationships among all the independent 
variables-features of the councils and their wider effects. Finally, this paper interprets the 
results of NDR flows in Wales in order to highlight structural aspects of the Welsh economy 
and its differences with the English one. 
This article is structured as follows. First, it presents the conceptual framework and, second, 
the empirical background in Wales, before, third, introducing the methodology employed. 
Fourth, this paper unpacks the geography of local finance in Wales, focusing on the NDR and 
the profile of the councils in terms of the net difference between NDR settlements (revenues), 
and contributions. Thereupon, this article sheds light on the potential effects of NDR local 
retention, before discussing the results. The final section concludes. 
Local tax systems and the recent transition towards fiscal devolution 
The significance of local taxation as an income source for the local government to sustain social 
welfare has been highlighted in local government and public finance literature (Baldwin and 
Krugman, 2004; Greenhalgh et al., 2016; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez, 2011). Local taxes 
are understood as the means of finance based on which residents of an area contribute to the 
expenditure for public services (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). Local taxes include 
taxation on property, business levies, and tourism taxes (Bird, 1999). Property taxation, 
specifically, constitutes the most important mode of local taxation (Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez, 2011). Bryson (1997) has shown that property taxation is reliant on the property 
value, size and type. 
There is an accepted view that local taxation constitutes also an important incentive for local 
authorities to attract economic activity and households in their territory (Domanski, 2003; 
Kapitsinis, 2018a). Therefore, local taxation presents great spatial variability since tax policies 
competition at the local level is strong (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Janeba and Osterloh, 
2013). Besides, local tax regulations have been frequently perceived as means for attracting 
households in an area and for influencing voters, as illustrated by Gemmell et al. (2002). On 
these grounds, local tax models are subject to changes by frequent reforms. 
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A major change in tax systems of several Western countries has been recorded during the last 
30 years, following a transition in the governance system. The decentralisation of power 
accompanied by fiscal devolution has changed the governance of finance systems in several 
countries (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008; Harrison, 2012; Marks et al., 2008; Mor and 
Sandford, 2017). Fiscal devolution could be related to the financialisation of urban areas, 
decentralisation, and market reforms focusing on growth (Brenner, 2003; Cox, 2009; Pike and 
Pollard, 2010). However, the recent fiscal decentralisation could not be seen as a wave towards 
localisation, since it has been driven by the fiscal consolidation and austerity policies applied 
in the aftermath of the 2007 global economic crisis (MacKinnon, 2015; Muldoon-Smith and 
Greenhalgh, 2015). Policy changes have often implied the retention of local taxes, thus 
modifying redistributive systems (Greenhalgh et al., 2016). Focusing on the property taxes in 
a decentralised fiscal system, the local authorities will seek to boost growth in their finance by 
extracting value from the properties in two ways (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). 
First, by developing new buildings to generate new tax yields; second, by investing in existing 
properties to raise their value. 
The decisions for tax devolution have been made, among other reasons, in order to provide 
incentives to local government to strengthen the prospects for economic growth, according to 
the advocates of fiscal decentralisation, as Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh have pointed out 
(2015). However, serious questions arise about the relation between local tax policy decisions 
and tax revenue increase and the correlation of a rise in local tax income with economic growth 
(Mor and Sandford, 2017). Indeed, evidence shows that local economic growth in England has 
not been strongly correlated with the increase in local property tax revenues (Muldoon-Smith 
and Greenhalgh, 2015; Sandford and Mor, 2017). 
Decentralisation and fiscal devolution have emerged in the wider transition towards the 
entrepreneurial city (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). Entrepreneurial city’s 
governance is significantly affected by the private sector, with a transition from managerialism 
to entrepreneurialism and a decreased focus on the provision of services (Harvey, 1989). 
Naturally, decentralising the property tax system and, thus, allowing the decision makers of the 
local authorities to alter local tax regulations could have two significant implications for the 
local government. First, it could strengthen the competition among councils for lower taxation 
and attraction of economic activity, either new premises or productive units (Schipper, 2014). 
Therefore, fiscal devolution might increase the risk of splitting the local authorities between 
locations that are more profitable for property investments and areas with less buoyant rental 
structures (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). Second, decentralisation, fiscal devolution, 
and urban financialisation could increase the unequal finance of local government and deepen 
the uneven geographical development (Aalbers, 2011; Gotham, 2016; Reuveny and Li, 2003). 
Empirical background 
The existing NDR system in Wales 
NDR constitute a tax on non-domestic properties (NDPs), such as businesses, hotels, and other 
non-residential properties, and are an important source of local government funding in Wales. 
They constitute the means of taxation based on which non-domestic property users contribute 
to the expenditure for local public services (Local Government Finance Act, 1988). The Welsh 
Government collects the NDR income derived from NDPs in the central list, while the LAs 
collect the business rates revenue from the local lists and pass it onto the Welsh Government. 
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Total NDR revenues raised by a council are equal to the sum of the NDR that all the users of 
NDPs pay. The business rate for a property is calculated by multiplying its Rateable Value 
(RV) by the NDR multiplier (‘poundage’), minus any reliefs for which the property is eligible 
(Local Government Finance Act, 1988). The RV is equal to ‘the rent at which it is estimated 
the hereditament might reasonably be expected to let from year to year if the tenant undertook 
to pay all usual tenant’s rates and taxes’ (Local Government Finance Act, 1988, section 56.2). 
Williams (2011) has argued that offices and companies in wealthy councils have higher NDR 
per square meter than factories and businesses in poorer areas. The RV is revalued every five 
years. The poundage, which is the same for all of the 22 Welsh councils, is set by the Welsh 
Government each year in line with the Consumer Price Index according to its level in 
September of the previous financial year to which the poundage refers. The reliefs are funded 
by the Welsh Government and are set to reduce the business rates for small businesses, 
unoccupied properties, and charities. 
Before 2015, NDR, after removing the appeals, used to be pooled with revenues generated in 
England. NDR were devolved to the Welsh Government in 2015, in the context of devolution 
of fiscal powers in the UK. The impact of decoupling Wales from the pool with England was 
significant, as it enhanced regional autonomy and provided greater freedom and more finance 
tools to the Welsh Government, thus allowing it to use the business rates in a strategic way to 
achieve wider economic goals. Since then, all NDR revenues are collected by the councils and 
are provided to the Welsh Government, paid into the NDR pool. Considering that the poundage 
records small fluctuations over time (Luchinskaya et al., 2017), the business rates collected by 
a council depend on the number and RV of NDPs. That is, a higher density of companies in a 
particular council entails more NDR revenues raised in its area. Moreover, low RV results in 
small amounts of NDR revenues collected. In this light, councils with relatively weak property 
market are likely to raise less NDR revenues than councils with vibrant rental structures, which 
record higher number and value of NDPs. Subsequently, a redistribution of NDR revenues is 
necessary to ensure a more equal allocation of resources and reduce inequalities among 
councils’ budgets. 
Indeed, the Welsh Government redistributes the NDR revenues to the councils based on their 
proportion of adult population (TFG, 2012). NDR revenues are pooled at Wales’s level, with 
the grant from the UK Government being used to correct for the fluctuations in NDR revenue. 
The distributable amount of NDR revenues is used, alongside the RSG and council tax, to 
finance the Local Government budget. NDR revenues are non-hypothecated, being usually 
spent by the councils to finance their local services, such as schools, social care and cultural 
services. 
Proposals for reform 
In 2011, the Welsh Government tasked the TFG to examine the way the NDR scheme could 
be reconfigured to boost local economic growth. The report recommended the devolution and 
retention of NDR revenues and the adjustment of RSG to each council, in such a way that total 
funds available for each LA would not change (TFG, 2012). The Group proposed 100% 
retention of NDR revenues for two years, which would then drop to 50%. However, the 
proposal was not specific in the sense that it did not describe the scheme in a systematic way 
and did not give any formulae for the proposed system. 
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The TFG came up with this recommendation after considering the opinions of more than 70 
respondents, including corporations, political parties and representative groups. Only two of 
the 22 councils responded to the consultation. Both councils rejected the proposed retention, 
claiming that no further incentives for local growth were required (TFG, 2012: 17). Large 
companies and representative bodies, such as the Confederation of British Industry and the 
South East Wales Economic Forum, were the keenest supporters of a Non-Domestic Rates 
Retention Scheme (NDRRS). The response of the Welsh Government was unenthusiastic, 
postponing any decision about local retention of NDR revenues until the NDR devolution to 
Wales was realised (Welsh Government, 2012b).  
In 2016, the ICLGFW made recommendations for the reform of local government funding, 
accounting for the evolving devolution settlement for Wales. The ICLGFW (2016) suggested 
100% retention of NDR revenues by the councils to facilitate more flexibility in local decision-
making and promote entrepreneurship. Alongside the retention, the Commission suggested 
adjusting the RSG for the initial year in such a way that total funds available for each council 
would not change. After Year 1, councils could either gain or lose revenues according to the 
level of NDR they raised.  
With such a NDRRS, councils would be incentivised to grow their local tax base and achieve 
economic growth. Councils would invest funds to increase the number of the NDPs, through 
new developments, expansion of existing floor space, or by changes in floor use towards high-
value usages. According to this argumentation, these actions would increase the local tax base 
and NDR, and thus the total income of councils. This proposal was not specific enough 
regarding its description of the proposed scheme and its impacts on local government funding. 
The response of the Welsh Government was again negative (Welsh Government, 2017). 
Data and Methodology 
In order to draw a detailed picture of the existing NDR scheme in Wales this paper estimates 
the difference of NDR settlements minus contributions (from now on, this will be referred to 
as ‘difference’) for each council. Moreover, to study the features of the existing winners and 
losers, the characteristics of the councils are examined in relation to the NDR difference. 
Specifically, the author employs correlation analysis to look at the relationship between NDR 
difference and economic growth (GVA and GDP per head), property market (rateable value 
and number of NDPs), unemployment rate, population, population density and average 
earnings, at the council level. The correlations with GVA and GDP per head are examined at 
the NUTS1 3 level. The reason is that data for these indexes is available only at this level. All 
data refers to the financial year 2014-15. This year is selected because it is the base year that 
the data for all the independent variables is available. Data sources include Stats Wales, 
Eurostat and the Welsh Government. 
Apart from the correlations, this paper expands the analysis and runs a cross-sectional multiple 
regression model, which adds to the analysis by examining the interrelationships among all the 
independent variables (Wooldridge, 2012). Thus, it adopts a novel methodological strategy that 
captures the wider picture of NDR flows in Wales, considering that most studies on NDR in 
the UK have employed descriptive statistics and case study approach (Greenhalgh et al., 2016; 
                                                 
1 NUTS is a standard that references the regions of the European Union countries, used by Eurostat. 
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Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015; Williams, 2011). Indeed, while correlation analysis 
indicates the relationship between a specific variable and the NDR difference, the regression 
analysis provides the broader picture by capturing the interrelationships among all the 
independent variables and their impact on the NDR difference, accounting for these 
interrelationships. 
Moreover, this paper adds to the literature of tax generation by examining it through the lens 
of the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) model. WLS overcomes an important disadvantage of 
the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method in regional economics. OLS treats all observations 
as equal, although observations may have different relative importance depending on their 
population (Artelaris et al., 2010; Kallioras and Petrakos, 2010). By contrast, WLS weights all 
the observations of the variables by weights based on their respective populations (Akita and 
Miyata, 2010). It is worth noting that this issue has been largely ignored in the regional 
economics literature before the 2000s. Some more recent studies have, however, adopted a 
WLS method (Fedorov, 2002; Kallioras and Petrakos, 2010; Petrakos and Artelaris, 2009). 
The model that is used takes the following form: 
𝑌𝑟 = ∑(𝛼𝜆𝛸𝜆,𝑟) +  𝜀𝑟
𝑛
𝜆=1
 
Yr is the dependent variable, which is the difference of NDR settlements minus contributions 
per head for region r in 2014-15. The dependent variable is ‘the variable to be explained in a 
multiple regression model’ (Wooldridge, 2012: 847). 
Xλ,r is the set of λ independent variables for region r under consideration. The independent 
variables are ‘used to explain the variation in the dependent variable’ (Wooldridge, 2012: 848). 
aλ is the set of the coefficients of the λ independent variables 
εr is the error term that accounts for unobserved factors, i.e. ‘the variable in a simple or multiple 
regression model that contains unobserved factors that affect the dependent variable’ 
(Wooldridge, 2012: 848). 
All variables were estimated at NUTS 3 level, since it is the only territorial level of analysis 
that data for GDP and GVA is available. While the correlations focus on the council level, the 
regression model examines the statistical association at the NUTS 3 region level, thus 
providing a comprehensive picture of the NDR system in Wales. The model seeks to analyse 
the correlation between the features of councils and NDR difference, using cross sectional data 
for 2014-15. The author does not examine the change over time, for which panel data studies 
would be better suited (Wooldridge, 2012). 
The main hypothesis is that, due to the redistributive mechanism of the existing NDR system, 
regions that are more economically advantaged are expected to demonstrate negative 
difference, i.e. lower NDR settlements that contributions. After reviewing the relevant 
literature and considering that the economic position of a region is influenced by its growth, 
income, property value, and unemployment levels, the following independent variables were 
chosen. 
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Economic growth variables 
GVA and GDP per head: GVA (Stats Wales data) and GDP (Eurostat data) are used as indexes 
of economic growth of a region, as estimated in 2015. Studies have shown that economic 
growth has a positive impact on tax revenue, since the income (Fenochietto and Pessino, 2013; 
Gupta, 2007; Le et al., 2012), and, thus, the property value that are taxed rise significantly (D’ 
Arcy et al., 1999; De Wit and Van Dijk, 2003; Udoekanem et al., 2014). Therefore, it is 
hypothesised that regions with lower GVA and GDP per capita demonstrate higher NDR 
settlements than contributions. 
Unemployment rate: It is used as estimated by Stats Wales in 2015 and is expected to be 
positively correlated with the dependent variable, as regions with higher unemployment are 
overall less advantageous (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; Pike et al., 2006). In fact, 
unemployment was found to have a negative impact on commercial property value (De Wit 
and Van Dijk, 2003; Tsolacos et al., 1998). Therefore, the regions with low unemployment rate 
are predicted to record higher NDR contributions than settlements. 
Average weekly earnings per head: It is estimated from 2011 to 2017 (Stats Wales data), as an 
indicator of income. The literature findings suggest a positive correlation between income and 
tax revenue (Fenochietto and Pessino, 2013; Gupta, 2007), as it is an index of the aggregate 
level of prosperity in a territory. Thus, it is expected that councils with lower average weekly 
earnings will record positive difference. 
Property market variables 
Total RV per capita: It is used as an index of property value, as valid in 2010 (UK Government, 
2017). The Total RV per capita was calculated as the sum of the rateable values of all the non-
domestic properties in a region divided by its total population. Business rates income depends 
on the total RV of a region (Williams, 2011). Amin-Smith et al. (2016) and Greenhalgh et al. 
(2016) have shown that councils with lower RV per capita have more possibilities to raise 
lower NDR revenues. The LAs with high RV per head are predicted to record negative 
difference. 
Average RV per head: It is used as an index of the number and value of NDPs in a region, as 
valid in 2010. The Average RV per head was estimated as the sum of the rateable values of all 
the non-domestic properties in a region divided by the total number of non-domestic properties 
and then divided by the total population of the region. It is predicted to be negatively correlated 
with the dependent variable (Greenhalgh et al., 2016; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). 
This index introduces the number of NDPs in a region, which is of great significance for total 
business rates revenues. Regions with lower average RV are likely to receive more NDR 
income than they contribute (Williams, 2011). 
Urbanisation variables 
Population density: It is used as an index of urbanisation. This paper uses the 2015 estimates 
(Stats Wales data). The population of a region affects the density and the level of urbanisation 
of an area (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; McDonald and McMillen, 2007; O’ Sullivan, 2011). 
Urbanised regions are expected to present higher value and number of NDPs (Greenhalgh et 
al., 2016; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). A negative relation of population density 
with the dependent variable is predicted. 
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The model has four different versions in order to capture the aggregate impact of the 
independent variables on the NDR difference. The first version looks at the impact of earnings 
per head, GVA per capita and RV per head. The second version adds the average RV per capita 
to account for the variation of RV across regions. The third version of the model controls 
earnings per head, RV per capita, GDP per head and the population density. The last version 
of the model adds unemployment rate and the average RV per capita and replaces the GDP 
with the GVA per capita. 
Empirical analysis 
The flow of NDR funds across Wales 
Almost three quarters of the Local Government budget is funded by the Welsh Government 
through the RSG and specific grants, while the rest is financed by locally raised taxes (Ogle et 
al., 2017). The significance of the NDR in Wales has grown since 2009-10 in the context of 
the budget cuts implemented by the UK Government to resolve the 2007 global economic 
crisis. In a similar way to that of England (Phillips and Simpson, 2016), the Welsh Local 
Government has experienced significant cuts of 16% (£805 million) in the RSG provided by 
the Welsh Government, from 2009-10 to 2016-17 (Ogle et al., 2017). NDR revenue 
contribution to the Welsh Local Government annual budgeted income has increased from 
10.9% in 2011-12 to 12% in 2016-17, at a value of around £1 billion (Luchinskaya et al., 2017). 
The net difference between the NDR revenues distributed to each LA from the Welsh 
Government pool and the contribution each LA made to the pool was estimated in the period 
between 2000-01 and 2015-162, using outturn data (Table I). The councils with the highest 
NDR generation, in absolute terms, include Cardiff, Swansea, Flintshire, Newport, and 
Rhondda Cynon Taf. These five LAs contribute on average the 46% of total NDR and receive 
36% of the NDR pool. Some LAs receive more business rates income than they contribute 
(positive difference), whereas for other councils the contributions exceed the settlements 
(negative difference). In particular, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Caerphilly, Powys, Carmarthenshire, 
and Blaenau Gwent record the biggest, and positive, average difference, while Swansea, 
Pembrokeshire, Flintshire, Newport, and Cardiff demonstrate the smallest average difference, 
which is negative. Looking closer at this data, the reader is specifically struck by the fact that 
four out of these five LAs are in the five councils with the largest NDR contributors. Therefore, 
the largest contributors record in average much lower NDR settlements than contributions, 
highlighting the complexities of local government finance (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 2008). 
Overall, ten LAs have never contributed more NDR revenues than they received, whereas five 
councils have received more NDR revenue than they contributed for more than half of the 16 
financial years between 2000-01 and 2015-16. 
 
Table I Approximately here 
 
The author calculated also the NDR difference at the NUTS 3 and NUTS 2 level. At the NUTS 
3 level, between 2000-01 and 2015-16, there were four regions with positive difference in all 
                                                 
2 The 2015-16 financial year was chosen since it was the latest year that all data for NDR generation was available. 
10 
 
the financial years, three with negative and five with a mixed picture, which means that they 
recorded financial years with both positive and negative NDR difference. Additionally, when 
the difference is calculated at the NUTS 2 level, the East Wales region records a negative 
difference, whereas the West Wales and the Valleys demonstrates a positive difference 
throughout the whole period. This is an expected result as West Wales and the Valleys region 
has a higher prevalence of relative deprivation, and additionally, was more affected by budget 
cuts compared to East Wales (Ogle et al., 2017). 
Moreover, within the quite heterogeneous NUTS 2 region of the West Wales and the Valleys, 
two different set of councils exist: on the one hand, the West Wales rural areas with low 
population and RV, and, on the other hand, the Valleys with higher population and RV. 
However, both groups of councils record a positive NDR difference. West Wales generates in 
average £160 million NDR and records an average difference of £30 million, in the period of 
reference. The Valleys contribute £234 million in average and record an average NDR 
difference of £41 million. These results provide evidence that measuring the difference 
between NDR settlements and contributions produces a comparable result with comparing the 
NDR generation. 
The profile of the councils in terms of the net difference between NDR settlements and 
contributions 
The results of the model (see Appendix A) demonstrate that the independent variables explain 
the variation in the dependent variable in all 4 versions of the model in a satisfactory way for 
two reasons. First, the adjusted R2 values are all higher than 0.9. The R2 indicates the level of 
the variation of the dependent variable that is explained by the independent variable 
(Wooldridge, 2012). Second, the models are statistically significant since the F Statistic values 
are all lower than 0.1. If F Statistic values are lower than 0.1, the independent variables explain 
the variation in the dependent variable at the 10% statistical significance level. While some of 
the coefficient values are quite small, the aim of the regression is to focus on the direction of 
the association, i.e. positive or negative relationship, and whether it is significant, rather than 
on the magnitude of the effect. 
According to the results of the correlations (see Appendix B) and the WLS, the NDR revenue 
contribution is positively associated with the economic growth of the Welsh NUTS 3 regions, 
whereas the difference is negatively correlated with GVA and GDP per head, thus verifying 
the hypothesis. Wealthy Welsh region generate more NDR than poorer regions and are more 
likely to receive less NDR settlement than they contribute, as they have higher property values 
and, thus, higher property tax revenue (D’ Arcy et al., 1999; Udoekanem et al., 2014). In other 
words, the councils with positive difference tend to be the economically disadvantageous and 
less developed areas, with low levels of GDP and GVA per head. 
The regions with positive difference tend to have low number of companies and property 
values. It is, therefore, very likely to have relatively weak property markets and small 
commercial tax base, and thus greater settlements than contributions. This finding confirms 
evidence from England, according to which the property structure of a council is closely 
correlated with the generation of business rates income (Amin-Smith et al., 2016; Greenhalgh 
et al., 2016). By contrast, the regions with negative difference demonstrate big commercial tax 
base, on the grounds of high business population and property values. Indeed, areas with high 
average RV per head contribute more NDR income than they receive (Williams, 2011). It 
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should be noted that Cardiff sometimes appears as an outlier that may be driving some of the 
results. However, Cardiff is included in the analysis to give a complete picture of the current 
NDR system. 
According to the correlation results, there is no clear association between the unemployment 
rate and the NDR settlements and difference, since the statistical significance is low. However, 
it is worth noting that four out of the five councils with the highest unemployment rate 
demonstrate a positive difference. The WLS model indicated that the unemployment rate is 
positively related to the NDR difference, thus verifying the expectations. That is, the regions 
with high unemployment rate are more likely to receive more NDR income than they 
contribute, since areas with higher unemployment are economically disadvantaged and tend to 
record lower commercial property values (De Wit and Van Dijk, 2003; Tsolacos et al., 1998). 
The average weekly earnings per head were found negatively correlated with the difference, as 
expected, since they are an indicator of local income and prosperity (Fenochietto and Pessino, 
2013; Gupta, 2007). The model unsurprisingly indicated that the regions with the highest 
earnings per head receive less NDR income than they contribute. Councils such as Cardiff, 
Flintshire, and Bridgend, which record the highest weekly average earnings, have all 
contributed more funds to the NDR pool than they received. By contrast, the regions with the 
lowest levels of weekly earnings, such as Blaenau Gwent, Powys, and Ceredigion, tend to 
receive great amounts of the redistributed NDR settlements and are more likely to record a 
higher and positive difference. 
Population density, indicating the level of urbanisation of the regions (O’ Sullivan, 2011), was 
found to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable. The most urbanised areas 
demonstrate a big local tax base and high property values (Pike et al., 2006). That is, the most 
densely populated areas contribute more funds to the NDR pool than they receive, as predicted. 
By contrast, less urbanised regions benefit from the existing NDR model, thus receiving more 
NDR income that they contribute. 
According to the correlation results, highly populated councils are expected to record a 
negative difference. Moreover, the proportion of the population aged above 16 years old is also 
negatively correlated with the difference. Therefore, the highly populated regions generate 
more NDR than they receive, although according to the existing legislation, the NDR pooled 
income is redistributed based on the level of adult population in a local authority (TFG, 2012). 
The impact of the population dynamics on the NDR flow is greater in the generation of business 
rates than in NDR settlements, as higher population often implies a higher number and value 
of NDPs (McDonald and McMillen, 2007). This highlights that the size of a territorial 
economy, which affects critical issues related to a region, including prosperity, production, and 
wage level (Armstrong and Taylor, 2000; Pike et al., 2006), matters for local tax base and local 
government finance. 
Towards a typology of the Welsh councils 
The analysis confirmed the main hypothesis of this paper, suggesting that councils which tend 
to receive more NDR revenue than they contribute (the ‘winners’) are likely to be the least 
economically developed, sparsely populated and rural councils, with relatively weak property 
markets. It is likely that these councils have a small tax base and low property prices, recording 
high unemployment, as well as low average earnings of citizens. In contrast, the councils that 
have a negative average NDR difference (the ‘losers’) are likely to be the more economically 
12 
 
developed, highly populated and urbanised councils. They are expected to have a buoyant 
property market, comparatively large tax base and high property values, lower unemployment, 
as well as higher average earnings, compared to councils with a positive NDR difference. On 
balance, the analysis indicates that the existing NDR scheme financially supports the councils 
which are economically disadvantaged (Table II). 
 
Table II Approximately here 
 
Expanding this analysis, it is important to mention that NDR revenue as a proportion of the 
councils’ income is geographically variegated (Figure I). In 2014-15, the NDR settlements 
accounted for the 12.4% on average of total income for the 22 councils in Wales (Stats Wales, 
2018). Monmouthshire (14.9%), Flintshire (13.7%) and Isle of Anglesey (13.2%) recorded the 
highest proportion, while Merthyr Tydfil (11.2%), Rhondda Cynon Taf (11.5%) and Neath Port 
Talbot (11.5%) recorded the lowest. Seven out of the ten councils with the highest NDR income 
contribution to their total revenues are among the councils with positive NDR difference. 
Therefore, the total income of the less economically advantaged councils is more dependent on 
the redistributed NDR revenues. 
 
Figure I Approximately here 
 
These results are of great importance for the discussion on a potential deeper decentralisation 
in Wales, which is often related to fiscal devolution (Harrison, 2012; Marks et al., 2008). The 
findings provide crucial insights to a possible NDR retention and its projected implications on 
regional inequalities. The economically disadvantaged regions are likely to lose from a scheme 
of business rates retention, thus deepening the regional disparity. 
The effects of a potential NDR retention 
To analyse the impact of local retention, the author computed as a benchmark a hypothetical 
100% retention of NDR without RSG adjustment, similar to the suggestion of ICLGFW (2016) 
after Year 1. Bearing in mind that the multiplier is not subject to important changes and is the 
same for all the 22 LAs, attention should be paid to the number of dwellings and the RV in 
order to understand the changes in local government finance if the business rates income is 
retained locally. Table III illustrates evidence for the number of rateable properties (2017) and 
the average RV of the Welsh councils in 2010 and 2017, after the revaluation of 2016. The 
reader is struck by the extent of the variation of rateable properties’ population and average RV 
among the 22 Welsh LAs. For instance, the number of rateable properties in Cardiff was 7 
times bigger than the one in Merthyr Tydfil, while the average RV in Cardiff was 3.5 bigger 
than the average RV in Powys in 2010 and 3 times bigger in 2017. The geographical variegation 
is verified by the high value of the coefficient of variation, which underscores a high variance 
of the number of rateable properties and the average RV among the Welsh councils. 
 
Table III Approximately here 
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The illustrated crucial differences could have a great impact on councils’ budgets under a local 
NDR retention scheme due to the different number of dwellings and the great variance of RV. 
On one hand, the LAs with big cities (Cardiff and Swansea), demonstrate the highest levels of 
rateable properties and RV, thus generating high NDR income. Correlation analysis highlights 
that councils with a high number of rateable properties, strongly related to the agglomeration 
size, are likely to record higher average RV. In fact, according to the urban economic theory 
and the theory of land value, a big number of business properties in an area is positively related 
to the size of the agglomeration, often entailing a rise in commercial property value (McDonald 
and McMillen, 2007; O’ Sullivan, 2011). By contrast, councils with small cities, such as 
Blaenau Gwent and Isle of Anglesey, far away from the urban centres, record low levels of 
rateable properties and RV, thereby resulting in low levels of locally-raised NDR revenue. 
The above analysis suggests that if a local NDR retention scheme were introduced, councils’ 
budgets could diverge further. The dependence of NDR generation on new floor space 
development entails the NDRRS benefiting the councils with buoyant property markets. The 
type and location of new developments are reliant on the rental structure and the motivation of 
investment interests (Bryson, 1997). Thus, the NDRRS in Wales could potentially foster the 
spatial differentiation between ‘premium’, ‘stranded’ and ‘redundant’ locations (Muldoon-
Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015). Premium areas have buoyant rental structures and are more 
profitable for property investments than the redundant areas which record less developed 
property markets. Moreover, stranded locations demonstrate strong property markets but face 
obstacles to utilise growth incentivisation schemes due to space availability restrictions. 
Especially in the context of recession, economic restructuring and weakening of the Welfare 
State, the policies to boost local economic growth based on the development of new 
commercial property could polarise spatial inequalities (Greenhalgh et al., 2016), as urban 
financialisation fosters geographical inequality (Aalbers, 2011; Gotham, 2016). NDRRS 
without RSG adjustment is a zero-sum game for local finance since premium locations are 
likely to outperform underdeveloped and non-favourable areas.  
The potential impact on the Welsh councils’ budgets is likely to be magnified due to the 
revaluation procedure, as well as the reliefs’ and appeals’ liability. First, the revaluation 
procedure could imply diverse changes by virtue of the geographical variation of revalued RV. 
For instance, in England in the 2017 revaluation, RV recorded an impressive increase of 28.4% 
in Inner London while it declined by -0.9% in the North East (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017). 
Second, the number of NDPs which are eligible for appeals and reliefs from NDR varies 
substantially across the 22 Welsh LAs (TFG, 2012). Therefore, the councils with the biggest 
numbers of small companies, unoccupied properties, and charities are likely to raise less NDR 
if the liability for reliefs is devolved to each council. At the moment, the liability for appeals 
and mandatory reliefs is pooled by the Welsh Government, thus minimising the impact on the 
budgets of individual councils. 
The impact of a simple 100% NDR retention scheme can be summarised as follows. Based on 
the average annual difference between the revenues under a simple 100% NDR retention and 
the NDR settlements under the existing scheme for each council between 2009-10 and 2015-
16, eighteen councils would have seen their revenue falling, while only four would have seen 
a rise in their income (Table IV). 
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Table IV Approximately here 
 
If the NDRRS had been applied since 2009-10, eleven councils would have seen their revenues 
falling drastically in all financial years (the average annual fall per capita in these councils 
would be £79), seven LAs would have had mixed results (some years with positive and some 
years with negative difference) and only four councils would have recorded increased revenues 
at each year over the period. Figure II compares LA incomes under the existing NDR regime 
with the estimated income under 100% NDR retention for each LA in 2015-16. It is important 
to note that all these estimations do not account any tariffs or top-ups, as the English system 
does (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017), or RSG adjustment. The aim of the calculation is to 
highlight the redistributive mechanism of the current NDR system. 
 
Figure II Approximately here 
 
Under the simple scheme of a hypothetical 100% retention of NDR without RSG adjustment, 
some councils would see their revenue falling relative to a fully pooled system while others 
would record higher revenues. Such a hypothetical system could result in an increasing 
divergence between councils in their relative income and spending (geographical impact), as 
fiscal devolution, closely related to decentralisation and urban financialisation, is likely to 
increase the unequal finance of local authorities, thus deepening the geographical unevenness 
(Brenner, 2003; Cox, 2009; Mor and Sandford, 2017). Councils with vibrant property markets 
and bigger increases in local tax base, would be more likely to secure higher income. By 
contrast, councils with less vibrant rental structures and smaller increases in local tax base, 
would likely experience reduced revenues. Similar to other cases in Europe (Gotham, 2016; 
Reuveny and Li, 2003), a decentralisation of local government spending, could reinforce the 
spatial disparities across Wales, since the fiscal devolution is associated with lower levels of 
income redistribution. 
Moreover, the retention of property taxes in Wales could increase the tax policies competition 
(Schipper, 2014). Considering that this type of competition is particularly strong at the local 
level (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Janeba and Osterloh, 2013), and that taxation is among 
the crucial means for local authorities to attract economic activity3 (Domanski, 2003; 
Kapitsinis, 2017), the councils would seek to rise their revenue by attracting new premises, on 
the grounds of a greater local autonomy and freedom for tax regulation. The risk of 
underfunding of social services delivered by the councils would rise, since under a 
decentralised scheme, the local authorities are able to apply their own funding policies 
following a ‘self-rule’ pathway (Elazar, 1987). 
A simple 100% NDR retention scheme could increase the financial pressure on the councils 
with less vibrant property markets regarding the delivery of basic social services provided at 
                                                 
3 Labour cost, taxation, and transportation cost are among the most important factors that affect firms’ location 
decisions (Kapitsinis, 2018b). 
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the local level across Wales (sectoral effect). Particularly, the funding for local services in the 
councils with reduced revenues would fall in the absence of the redistributed NDR income. 
Such councils might need to apply further cuts in local services, thus deteriorating their 
citizens’ living standards. The sectoral impact could be interpreted as an increased risk of 
unequal provision of social services across the 22 councils in Wales. 
Finally, the retention of NDR and the subsequent efforts to increase local income through new 
floor space development could result in overbuilding. Indeed, a building boom, which may 
occur in the locations with vibrant property markets that attract new developments, is likely to 
result in overbuilding in a form of capital-based growth (Greenhalgh et al., 2003). This is more 
possible when such a building boom is not accompanied by a rise in demand for properties 
(Weber, 2002). Therefore, it is worth thinking about the policy goal to achieve economic 
growth extensively based on new building developments. This discussion is connected with 
the relationship between the built environment and sustainable economic growth. Evidence 
shows that the increase in NDR revenues has not been strongly related to GVA growth in 
England from 2010 to 2015 (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015; Sandford and Mor, 2017). 
Changes in NDR model could fall on landlords and could be capitalised into rents, especially 
when demand for property is more sensitive to changes in prices and the supply of property is 
less sensitive to price differentiations (TFG, 2012). Moreover, issues of non-predictability 
should be considered, as businesses move across regions (National Audit Office, 2017). 
Discussion 
A reasonable interpretation of the results contributes to our knowledge about the Welsh 
economy. Its structural issues, and the comparison with the English economy, could be seen 
through the lenses of NDR contribution. Although the major differentiation in the UK economy 
occurs mainly between the North (West Midlands, Yorkshire–Humberside, North West, North 
East, Scotland, and Wales) and South (London, South East, East of England, South West and 
East Midlands), at NUTS 1 level (Gardinder et al., 2013), some valuable conclusions about the 
differences between Wales and England could be drawn when NDR generation is examined. 
The five councils with the highest NDR generation are in (Cardiff, Swansea, Newport) or close 
(Rhondda Cynon Taf) to the three main urban centres of Wales, apart from Flintshire. The high 
NDR generation in this north council, which has common borders with England, is justified by 
the fact that several big multinational corporations are located in Flintshire, such as TATA, 
Airbus and Toyota, entailing high RVs. This is related to the great concentration of high-impact 
industries in North Wales which highlights that there is not such a significant division between 
North and South in Wales, relative to England (Gardiner et al., 2013). Wales records a deep 
division between East (the Eastern Wales and the Valleys) and West (West Wales, with rural 
areas), also reproducing a model of core-periphery division. North Wales has historically 
demonstrated significant inward investments (Thomas, 1996). Apart from Flintshire, Wrexham 
is home to big manufacturers, such as Kelloggs and Cadbury, financial services, with the 
Development Bank of Wales, and biopharmaceutical businesses, including Ipsen, highlighting 
the turn of this regional economy towards financial and biotechnology industries. 
Consequently, Flintshire is the council with the second highest GVA per head in Wales, while 
Wrexham is ranked 8th. On balance, the top ten councils in terms of GVA per head in Wales 
include six councils in South Wales, three in North Wales, and Powys. 
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By contrast, Blaenau Gwent, Isle of Anglesey, Merthyr Tydfil and Ceredigion are the councils 
with the lowest NDR generation. Isle of Anglesey and Ceredigion are mainly rural regions, and 
not close to the big urban centres, thus resulting in low NDR contributions. Although Blaenau 
Gwent and Merthyr Tydfil are close to the capital of Wales, the NDR generation is quite low, 
relative to other councils close to Cardiff, such as Rhondda Cynon Taf. This difference could 
be explained by two facts. First, Rhondda Cynon Taf is a secondary urban area, having common 
borders with the urban area of Cardiff. By contrast, Blaenau Gwent and Merthyr Tydfil do not 
have common borders with Cardiff council. Second, features of these regional economies are 
also important. Blaenau Gwent and Merthyr Tydfil record the lowest average GVA in Wales 
in 1997-2015, a fact that highlights that the low level of economic growth has a negative impact 
on tax generation (De Wit and Van Dijk, 2003; Udoekanem et al., 2014). 
Therefore, and according to the results of the correlations and the regression, the three major 
cities (Cardiff, Swansea, and Newport) and councils in secondary urban areas, that border the 
urban centres (Rhondda Cynon Taf, Caerphilly, Vale of Glamorgan, Neath Port Talbot, 
Carmarthenshire) perform well in terms of economic growth and tax generation. By contrast, 
rural areas appear to record the lowest levels of NDR contribution and GVA. However, in 
England, there is a long list of underperforming urban areas that are redundant locations in 
terms of property tax generation: usually secondary urban areas in the North, like South and 
North Tyneside close to Newcastle, Bury and Oldham close to Manchester (Muldoon-Smith 
and Greenhalg, 2015). Moreover, South Tyneside demonstrates the lowest GVA per capita in 
1997-2015 among the 326 English councils, North Tyneside is ranked 251st, Bury 284th, while 
Oldham 311th (ONS data). This could indicate a structural difference in the regional economy 
of Wales, compared to England. Considering in addition the abovementioned low inequality 
between North and South Wales, and the unequal levels of economic growth and 
financialisation, the Welsh and the English economies demonstrate significant differences 
(Thomas, 1996; Gardiner et al., 2013), which are also highlighted through the analysis of NDR 
flows. 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the operation of the existing NDR system in Wales and the possible 
impacts of a potential retention of business rates income by the councils. It enriched the 
literature on local property taxation and NDR in the UK, in the following ways. 
Initially, this first in-depth investigation of the business rates system in Wales, indicated that, 
although the redistributive mechanism is based on population, the current NDR scheme is 
socially fair as the annual budgeted income of the economically disadvantaged councils is 
considerably supported by the redistributed amounts of NDR revenues, which are mainly raised 
in the wealthy areas. The poorer councils record a positive difference between NDR settlements 
and contributions, while NDR settlements represent an important proportion of these councils’ 
total revenues, usually higher than for the councils with negative difference. On balance, the 
existing NDR model dampens the widening of regional spending and local public service 
provision disparities. 
Second, the methodology that this paper adopted is original. While most studies on NDR flows 
in the UK have used descriptive statistics and case study approach (Greenhalgh et al., 2016; 
Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015; Williams, 2011), this paper employed correlation and 
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regression analysis. That is, it attempted to capture the relation between specific features of the 
councils and NDR contributions and settlements, and to study the interrelationships among all 
variables. Moreover, it employed a WLS regression model, beyond the simple OLS, thus 
accounting for the different population weight of each region, an issue that has been largely 
ignored in the regional economics literature (Artelaris et al., 2010; Kallioras and Petrakos, 
2010). 
Third, this paper interpreted the results in a way that they contribute to our knowledge about 
the Welsh economy and its differences with the English one. The examination of NDR flows 
indicated that there is not such a significant division between North and South in Wales, relative 
to England (Gardiner et al., 2013). By contrast, Wales records a deep division between East 
(the Eastern Wales and the Valleys) and West (West Wales, with rural areas). Moreover, the 
three major cities (Cardiff, Swansea, and Newport) and councils in secondary urban areas, that 
border these urban centres, perform well in terms of economic growth and tax generation, while 
rural regions appear to record the lowest levels of NDR contribution and GVA. By contrast, in 
England, there is a long list of underperforming urban regions, usually secondary urban areas 
in the North. 
Finally, while most studies in retention of business rates in the UK have sought to evaluate the 
impact of policy changes that have been already adopted (Amin-Smith and Phillips, 2017; 
Greenhalgh et al., 2016; Mor and Sandford, 2017; Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015), this 
paper studied the potential impacts of a future retention of NDR by the Welsh councils. The 
findings reveal that in a possible 100% retention of NDR without RSG adjustment, the councils 
with less vibrant property markets would see their revenue falling relative to a fully pooled 
system while others, with buoyant rental structures, would record higher revenues. Such a 
hypothetical NDR model might lead to increasing divergence of councils’ relative income and 
deeper regional inequalities. Therefore, careful strategies should be planned regarding any 
decentralisation of business rates income. 
Turning to the policy recommendations, the decision of the Welsh Government to keep the 
existing NDR system unchanged, mentioning that it is a fair approach (Welsh Government, 
2017), is supported by the evidence provided by this paper. A suggestion to financially support 
the delivery of public services by the councils could be to introduce a needs-based factor in the 
redistribution of the pooled NDR income, which would entail a further divergence of the NDR 
models between Wales and England. This factor would account for the needs of each council 
including, apart from the population, indexes such as unemployment, income per capita, and 
deprivation. In a potential application of NDR income retention, either the RSG should be 
adjusted or a mechanism of tariffs and top-ups should be established, towards the direction of 
backing the financial support of the economically disadvantaged councils. 
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Appendix A The results of the regression analysis 
 1st version of the model 2nd version of the model 3rd version of the model 4th version of the model 
 
Coefficient 
P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
C 0.6434 0.002 508.1329 0.038 0.5468 0.003 0.3461 0.001 
Earnings per head -0.0006* 0.055 -0.2993 0.501 -0.0004 0.131 -0.0001 0.176 
GVA per capita -6.99126E-06 0.197 -0.0132*** 0.003   -1.89846E-06 0.383 
RV per head -0.1792* 0.087   -0.1557* 0.079 -0.2254*** 0.001 
Average RV per 
capita 
  -3.6493* 0.094   -529.2826** 0.011 
GDP per head     -5.15145E-06* 0.092   
Density     -1.64483E-05* 0.061 -1.49355E-05*** 0.007 
Unemployment 
Rate 
      752.6378** 0.033 
Adjusted R2 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.99 
***Statistically significant in 1% 
**Statistically significant in 5% 
*Statistically significant in 10% 
 
Appendix B Correlation analysis 
Independent variable Dependent variable 
Correlation 
coefficient  
R2 P-value 
GVA per head NDR contributions per head 0.025 0.86 0.00 
GVA per head NDR difference per head -0.023 0.85 0.00 
GDP per head NDR contributions per head 0.016 0.86 0.00 
GDP per head NDR difference per head -0.015 0.84 0.00 
Average RV NDR difference -2287 0.54 0.00 
Number of rateable properties NDR difference -5.76 0.41 0.00 
Unemployment rate NDR settlements 1965 0.03 0.38 
Unemployment rate NDR difference -724 0.00 0.77 
Population NDR difference -0.188 0.36 0.00 
Population 16+ NDR difference -0.227 0.34 0.00 
Population density NDR difference -12.24 0.64 0.00 
Average weekly earnings NDR settlements 328 0.27 0.01 
Average weekly earnings NDR difference -370 0.28 0.01 
Number of rateable properties Average RV (2017) 1.01 0.15 0.06 
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Figure I. NDR revenue settlements’ contribution (%) to total LA income, 2014-15. 
Source: ICLGFW (2016). 
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Figure II. NDR revenue with and without simple 100% retention for each council, 2015-16, 
£ thousands, cash terms. 
Source: Stats Wales (2018) and author’s calculations 
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Table I. Summary of the net difference settlements-contributions for each LA. 
 No. of times NDR 
contributions exceeded 
settlements (2000-01 to 
2015-16) 
Average net difference in 
cash terms (£ million) 
Average net difference per 
capita (£) 
Isle of Anglesey 1 2.49 73.75 
Gwynedd  8 0.04 0.36 
Conwy  0 2.52 45.61 
Denbighshire  0 2.82 61.70 
Flintshire  16 -5.81 -78.93 
Wrexham  10 0.05 0.64 
Powys  0 5.28 82.93 
Ceredigion  0 3.06 83.75 
Pembrokeshire  6 -1.26 -20.49 
Carmarthenshire  0 4.87 55.57 
Swansea  9 -0.71 -6.24 
Neath Port Talbot  2 1.32 19.71 
Bridgend  11 -0.33 -5.09 
Vale of Glamorgan  10 -0.65 -11.13 
Rhondda Cynon Taf  0 7.33 64.33 
Merthyr Tydfil  5 0.42 15.35 
Caerphilly  0 6.71 78.48 
Blaenau Gwent  0 3.34 99.04 
Torfaen  0 1.81 40.83 
Monmouthshire  0 2.01 45.87 
Newport  16 -6.93 -99.7 
Cardiff 16 -29.79 -182 
Notes: Average net difference is calculated as average settlements less average contributions, 2000-01 
to 2015-16. Figures are in cash terms. Source: Stats Wales (2018) and author’s calculations. 
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Table II. A classification of the councils according to the NDR difference. 
 The winners: councils with 
positive NDR difference 
The losers: councils with 
negative NDR difference 
Features Economically less strong 
  
Weak property market 
 
Small tax base 
 
Rural councils 
 
Low property prices 
 
Low populated 
 
Low average earnings 
 
High unemployment 
Economically more strong 
 
Vibrant property market 
 
Big tax base 
 
Urbanised councils 
 
High property prices 
 
Highly populated 
 
High average earnings 
 
Low unemployment 
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Table III. Rateable properties and average RV across the 22 councils 
 Number of rateable properties Average RV (Mean) (£) 
 2017 2010 2017 
Isle of Anglesey 2,900 14,000 13,000 
Gwynedd  7,490 14,000 15,000 
Conwy 5,250 15,000 16,000 
Denbighshire 4,150 14,000 15,000 
Flintshire 5,320 29,000 28,000 
Wrexham 4,300 24,000 23,000 
Powys 6,840 11,000 12,000 
Ceredigion 3,740 14,000 14,000 
Pembrokeshire 6,610 19,000 19,000 
Carmarthenshire 7,130 17,000 16,000 
Swansea 7,730 25,000 24,000 
Neath Port Talbot 4,060 25,000 22,000 
Bridgend 4,290 25,000 23,000 
The Vale of Glamorgan 3,570 26,000 23,000 
Cardiff 12,420 38,000 37,000 
Rhondda Cynon Taf 6,870 20,000 19,000 
Merthyr Tydfil 1,780 24,000 22,000 
Caerphilly 4,800 19,000 18,000 
Blaenau Gwent 2,210 16,000 14,000 
Torfaen 2,770 21,000 21,000 
Monmouthshire 3,190 18,000 19,000 
Newport 4,700 34,000 31,000 
Mean 5,096 21,000 20,182 
Coefficient of Variation 0.47 0.33 0.31 
Source: UK Government (2017) and author’s calculations 
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Table IV. Average difference between NDR income with retention and NDR income with the 
existing scheme, 2009-10 to 2015-16 (£ thousands). 
Council Difference (£ ‘000s) 
Isle of Anglesey  -7,143 
Gwynedd  -1,553 
Conwy  -6,112 
Denbighshire  -7,680 
Flintshire  14,317 
Wrexham -1,133 
Powys -12,892 
Ceredigion -6,314 
Pembrokeshire 9,116 
Carmarthenshire -9,644 
Swansea 195 
Neath Port Talbot -2,372 
Bridgend -234 
Vale of Glamorgan -942 
Rhondda Cynon Taf -18,828 
Merthyr Tydfil -712 
Caerphilly -16,370 
Blaenau Gwent -8,094 
Torfaen -4,889 
Monmouthshire -6,127 
Newport 15,381 
Cardiff 73,448 
Source: Stats Wales (2018) and author’s calculations. 
 
